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Recent research shows that variation in teacher quality has large effects 
on  student  performance.    However,  this  research  is  based  entirely  on 
student test scores.  Focusing on high-school math teachers, this paper 
evaluates teacher quality in terms of another educational outcome of great 
interest – graduation.  I use a unique instrumental variables approach to 
identify teacher effects and find that differences in teacher quality have 
large  effects  on  graduation  outcomes.    Because  teacher  effects  on 
graduation outcomes will be more pronounced for students who are on the 
graduation  margin,  the  results  imply  an  avenue  through  which  high-
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Education  Secretary  Margaret  Spellings  recently  referred  to  a  small  group  of  largely  urban 
schools as "dropout factories” and did so with good reason – these schools are graduating less 
than 50 percent of their students.  In fact, Orfield et al. (2004) show that in almost half of the 
high schools in the 100 largest urban school districts in the country, 12
th-grade classes are less 
than 50 percent of the size of 9
th-grade classes four years earlier.  This “graduation rate crisis,” as 
it has been dubbed by these authors, is of great economic significance.  For example, Ashenfelter 
and Krueger (1994) estimate that an extra year of schooling corresponds to a 12 to 16 percent 
increase in wages and Barrow and Rouse (2004) estimate that in 2003, high school graduates 
earned approximately 75 percent more than high school dropouts annually.
1  Furthermore, in 
addition to the costs of dropping out borne by individuals, high dropout rates are also associated 
with negative externalities.  Lochner and   Moretti  (2004)  estimate  that  a  1-percentage-point 
increase in high school completion among men ages 20 to 60 would save the United States $1.4 
billion per year by reducing costs associated with crime.   
 
The recent teacher-quality literature overwhelmingly indicates that differences in teacher quality 
have large effects on student performance measured by test scores.
2  Given this result, and that 
graduation outcomes are of such great economic importance, it seems natural to ask whether 
teacher quality affects graduation outcomes.
3  Econometrically, analyzing teacher quality in 
terms of graduation outcomes is complicated by the non -random assignment of students to 
                                                 
1 Rouse (1999) does a follow-up study to Ashenfelter and Krueger and finds that these authors may have overstated 
the returns to schooling, which are actually closer to 10 percent per year.  Estimates from Barrow and Rouse 
incorporate the facts that high school graduates earn higher wages and work more hours. 
2 See, for example, Aaronson et al. (2007), Hanushek et al. (2005), Koedel (2007), Nye et al. (2004), Rivkin et al. 
(2005), Rockoff (2004). 
3 Loeb and Page (2000) find that teacher salary increases have a positive effect on graduation rates ten years later.  
However, they do not evaluate the extent to which variation in teacher quality, measured at the micro level, affects 
graduation outcomes.   2 
teachers.  In the test-score literature, panel datasets have been exploited to remove bias generated 
by this non-random student-teacher matching.  Specifically, test-score studies have relied on 
lagged measures of performance and student fixed effects to remove sorting bias.
4  However, in 
the analysis of graduation outcomes these methods cannot be implemented because graduation 
outcomes cannot be tracked over time as can test -score outcomes.  At a given point in time, a 
student simply drops out of school or does not. 
 
I use a unique  instrumental variables approach  based on variation from yearl y school-level 
staffing changes  to identify teacher effects on graduation outcomes.  D ifferences in teacher 
quality  are shown to  have non-negligible effects,  even within schools.  This implies that  
improvements in teacher quality can help mitigate the graduation-rate crisis faced by many urban 
school districts across the country.   More generally, this finding is also relevant in the debate 
over which types of students are more responsive to changes in teacher quality.   Whereas recent 
research by Clotfelter et al.  (2006), based on student test-score performance, indicates that the 
returns to teacher quality may be higher for advantaged students, the evid ence here shows that 
the weakest students also have much to gain from improvements in teacher quality.   
 
I.  Empirical Strategy 
Students’  teachers  throughout  high  school  are  likely  to  be  endogenous  to  their  graduation 
outcomes.    This  endogeneity  may  manifest  itself  either  through  direct  teacher  selection  by 
students within subjects, or through subject selection (e.g., choosing to take calculus) that affects 
teacher selection.  In addition, graduation outcomes may be correlated with the assignment of 
students to teachers by administrators.  To identify teacher effects, I exploit exogenous variation 
                                                 
4 Recent work by Rothstein (2008) suggests that these methods may be insufficient for removing sorting bias.   3 
in the exposure of students to teachers over time.  This variation comes from yearly school-level 
staffing changes and is highest among math teachers, who are the focus of this study.  I jointly 
model  students’  graduation  outcomes  with  teacher  selection  and  estimate  teacher  effects  via 
maximum likelihood.   
 
Consider the following empirical model of the student dropout decision.  Let 
*
i D  denote the net 
benefit to student i of dropping out of high school where:   
 
       
*
01 i i i J i D X T                  (1) 
 
In equation (1), the vector Xi includes controls for demographics, socioeconomic status, English-
learner status, whether or not the student switched schools during high school and the initial 
math class taken in ninth grade for each student.  The J-dimensional vector Ti indicates which 
teachers  taught  student  i  during  high  school  and  is  likely  to  be  endogenous  to  the  dropout 
outcome.  Student i’s decision to drop out, Di, is a zero-one indicator that is equal to one if 
*
i D  ≥ 
0 and equal to zero otherwise. 
 
The  initial-math-course  controls  in  equation  (1)  provide  a  measure  of  pre-high  school 
performance as pre-high school performance determines initial math-course placement in high 
school.
5  Additionally, they  capture the effects of tracking within schools.  For example,  if 
students  who start high school   in  remedial  math  classes  are more likely to   attend  remedial 
                                                 
5 I also considered including pre-high school test scores in the dropout specification but there was a substantial 
portion of the student sample that did not have test-score records for the 8
th grade.  This is because I focus on 
underperforming schools in San Diego which tend to have the most transient student populations (see Section II).   4 
English classes, remedial history classes, and so on, these controls will capture the effects of this 
tracking.  Not surprisingly, the initial-math-course controls are strong predictors of graduation.   
 
Teacher selection throughout high school for each student, Ti, can be similarly modeled.  The 
underlying  teacher-selection  function,  Ti*,  depends  on  the  same  explanatory  variables  as  in 
equation (1) and an additional set of controls that capture student-teacher exposure.  For all j in 
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Each observed Tij is a dichotomous outcome equal to one if student i had teacher j at any point in 
high school and equal to zero otherwise.  In equation set (2), the vector Zij is excluded from the 
dropout equation and used to identify the effect of teacher j.   
 
                                                 
6 The teacher selection equations are not mutually exclusive.  Theoretically, a by-year multinomial model of teacher 
selection may be more complete in that, in most cases, the choice of one teacher may exclude choosing others within 
years.  However, the parameter space for such a model would be so large that it would be infeasible to estimate. 
7 The vast majority of student-teacher matches are for one year although some students and teachers were matched 
for up to three years in the data.  The model does not allow the effect of multiple years with a given teacher to differ 
from the effect of a single semester with that teacher.  However, students that are taught by the same teacher in 
multiple years are also likely to be in more exposed to that teacher based on the year and math-course level in which 
they enter high school.  Differences in this student-teacher exposure will be used to identify the teacher effects as 
discussed below.   5 
The error terms   ,  1 u ,…,  J u  are assumed to be joint-normally distributed with mean zero and 
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In (3), I assume the standard normalization 
2





JJ uu  = 1.  In the absence of this 
assumption, the coefficients and error variances in (1) and (2) are only identified up to their 
proportions.  The distributional assumption in (3) allows for correlation between the error terms 
in the teacher-selection and dropout equations.   Given this framework, the dropout decision is 
specified as a probit and teacher selection as a binary, endogenous determinant of graduation.   
 
The probit-based estimation strategy is preferred to its linear analog.  One reason is that a linear 
model lacks flexibility. For example, if the dropout outcome were specified as a linear function 
of  the  explanatory  variables  it  would  restrict  teacher  effects  to  be  the  same  across  students 
regardless of the Xi’s; despite the fact that students’ probabilities of dropping out vary widely 
across the Xi’s (see Table 2 and Appendix Tables A.1 – A.3).  This inflexibility in the linear 
model will result in predicted probabilities of the dependent variables that are not between zero 
and one.
8   
                                                 
8 Additionally, Monte Carlo exercises performed by Bhattacharya et al. (2006) strongly support the probit-based 
approach over the linear-probability-model analog, particularly where P(Di = 1) is relatively small as is the case in 
my models.  In fact, even when the multivariate probit is misspecified (i.e., the underlying data generating process is   6 
 
My  identification  strategy  relies  on  variation  in  the  classes  taught  by  teachers  over  time  to 
identify  teacher  effects.    For  example,  consider  a  math  teacher  who  teaches  four  classes  of 
algebra and one class of geometry in one year.  In the next year, this teacher might teach two 
classes of algebra and three classes of geometry.  Furthermore, some teachers move in and out 
schools over time.  Figure 1 shows four examples of variation in the proportion of the total 
number of student semesters taught in different subjects over time for four different teachers 
used in this analysis.  Given this variation in the classes taught by teachers over time, differences 
in the classes taken and the timing of classes taken by students create variation in student-teacher 
exposure.  For example, depending on what year a given student happens to take geometry, the 
probability of that student being taught by teacher j may change simply because teacher j teaches 
more (or fewer) geometry classes in that year.   
 
If  I  were to  assume that  students’ own math-course choices  are exogenous  to  their dropout 
decisions,  I  could  instrument  for  teacher  selection  using  each  student’s  own  class  schedule 
throughout  high  school.    For  example,  the  math-course  path  algebra-geometry-intermediate 
algebra-precalculus, followed over a four year sequence by some student, would imply exposure 
to a specific set of teachers.  However, the course choices made by students during high school 
are unlikely to be exogenous to their dropout decisions.  Therefore, rather than use each student’s 
own class schedule to instrument for teacher selection, I instead use each student’s entry-level 
math course in ninth grade to project her subsequent math-course path based on sample-wide 
averages (probabilistic).  For example, for students who took algebra in the ninth grade at school 
                                                                                                                                                             
not multivariate normal), they show that it still produces treatment-effect estimates that are generally less biased 
than the analogous linear-based specification.   7 
X, I can map out the proportion who took each type of math course in subsequent years and in 
this way create an average math-course path for these students at school X.  Because high-school 
students generally take math courses in a particular sequence, students’ ninth-grade math courses 
are strong predictors of their math-course paths.
9 
 
I create math-course paths at each school based on seven possible entry -level math courses.
10  
For each student, I replace her  own math-course choices with the average math -course path 
corresponding to her entry-level math course at her school, thereby removing the  potentially 
endogenous decisions of individual stud ents from the instrument sets.   To avoid building the 
effects of the treatments (teache rs) into the instruments, and to further alleviate endogeneity 
concerns, I exclude students’ own year-cohorts when calculating the math course paths. 
 
For  teacher-selection  equation  j,  I  interact  the  students’  projected  math-course  paths  with 
indicator variables for the subject-years that teacher j teaches to complete the instrument sets.    I 
define seven subject-types by which students and teachers can be matched in any given year: 
pre-algebra  (that  is,  anything  below  algebra),  algebra,  geometry,  advanced  geometry, 
intermediate  algebra,  advanced  intermediate  algebra  and  advanced  math  (pre-calculus  and 
calculus).  The incorporation of teachers’ teaching schedules into the instrument sets means that 
the  teacher  effects  are  identified  from  contemporaneous  student-teacher  exposure  and  will 
                                                 
9 Individual students deviate from the standard math-course path given their entry-level math course for many 
reasons.  Most commonly, a student may be required to re-take a course.  Students’ math-course paths are averaged 
within groups such that some fraction of each group is expected to deviate from the standard math-course path given 
their entry-level math course. 
10 The seven math-course paths are based on the following entry-level mathematics classifications: No math, pre-
algebra, pre-algebra/algebra, algebra, algebra/geometry, geometry, advanced geometry.  Pre-algebra/algebra and 
algebra/geometry indicate split years.  None of the (few) students who entered high school at a level above advanced 
geometry failed to graduate.  Therefore, these students were omitted from the analysis.  Recall that students’ entry-
level math classes are included directly into the dropout equation in addition to the teacher selection equations.  
Therefore, the instruments are just the projected math-course paths.   8 
improve instrument performance.  To see this, note that all of the instruments used here are based 
on the same underlying information about students’ class schedules.  For example, conditional 
on knowing the probability of a student taking algebra in year X, knowing the probability of her 
taking geometry will do little to better predict the probability of her being taught by an algebra 
teacher in year X.  Adding additional instruments that provide little in terms of extra explanatory 
power can increase estimation bias (Murray, 2006).  The interaction of students’ class schedules 
with teachers’ teaching schedules provides an intuitive and systematic approach to limiting the 
presence of largely irrelevant instruments in the teacher selection equations. 
 
Equations (4) and (5) detail the instrument construction, performed within schools.  Let h index a 
student’s year-cohort based on the year in which he or she was in the ninth grade.  Let Dihskt be 
an indicator for whether student i in year-cohort h started high school in math-course s and took 
math-course k in year t of high school.  Let H represent the number of cohorts, Nh the number of 
students in cohort h, and Nhs the number of students in cohort h who started high-school in math-
course s.  Then Cihskt is defined as the predicted probability that student i in year-cohort h who 
started high school in math-course s took math-course k in year t, estimated using the course 











   (4) 
 
Let Ci be a kt-dimensional row vector where the entries indicate the probabilities of student i 
taking each math-course k in each year t, as calculated by (4).  Let Gj be a kt-by-kt diagonal 
matrix where the diagonal entries are set to one in any subject-year that teacher j teaches and   9 
zero otherwise.  The kt-dimensional row vector of instruments for any given student-teacher 
match, Zij, can be written: 
  Zij = Ci*Gj  (5) 
 
 
The instrument vector in (5) includes zero entries in subject-years where teacher j does not teach 
and/or where student i does not take a given math course.  The column rank of the instrument 
matrix for teacher j, Zj, is Kj, where Kj is the number of subject-years where teacher j teaches. 
 
II.  Data  
 
I use administrative data linking students and teachers at the classroom level from the San Diego 
Unified School District (SDUSD).  SDUSD is the second largest school district in California 
(enrolling  approximately  141,000  students  in  1999-2000)  and  the  student  population  is 
approximately 27 percent white, 37 percent Hispanic, 18 percent Asian/Pacific Islander and 16 
percent black.  Twenty-eight percent of the students at SDUSD are English Learners, and 60 
percent are eligible for meal assistance.  Both of these shares are larger than those of the state of 
California as a whole.  As far as standardized testing performance, students at SDUSD trailed 
very slightly behind the national average in reading in 1999-2000.  On the contrary, SDUSD 
students narrowly exceeded national norms in math.
11  The California Department of Education 
reported the 4-year derived dropout rate at SDUSD  to be approximately 13 percent in 1999-
2000.
12   
                                                 
11 District characteristics summarized from Betts et al. (2003). 
12 The dropout outcome may be measured with error as a result of the data collection process.  When a student 
leaves the district, the district relies on the student’s new school to request a transcript to verify that the student did 
not drop out.  If there is no such request, SDUSD uses the available contact information for the student to attempt to 
determine whether a dropout has occurred.  When transcripts are not requested and the student cannot be reached, 
the student will generally be considered a dropout.  Hausman et al. (1998) show that probit estimates may be 
inconsistent when there is measurement error in the dependent variable.  Although I also consider linear SIV   10 
 
Because dropouts occur in all years of high school, it is important to observe each student from 
the 9
th through (potentially) the 12
th grade.  The student data consist of four successive year-
cohorts beginning with students in the 9
th grade in 1997-1998 and ending with students in the 9
th 
grade in 2000-2001.  This latter group entered the 12
th grade in the final year of the data panel, 
2003-2004.  To be included in the analysis, students had to be enrolled at SDUSD in the 9
th 
grade.   
 
SDUSD  is  a  geographically  large  district  with  16  standard,  full-enrollment  high  schools.
13  
However, there is considerable variation in the dropout rate across schools.  For example, 4-year 
derived dropout rates at the school level ranged from less than one percent to over 20 percent in 
1999-2000.  These across-school differences in the dropout rate make it difficult to argue that 
teachers at each school at SDUSD are equally concerned with dropouts.  That is, teachers at low-
dropout-rate schools may not view deterring dropouts as a significant part of their job whereas 
teachers at high-dropout-rate schools, some of whom may watch one in five students fail to 
graduate, are unlikely to feel the same.   
 
Because of these diff erences in dropout environments ,  teacher quality measured by dropout 
outcomes is likely to be a more relevant measure at  high-dropout-rate schools.
14  With this in 
mind, I focus my analysis on the four schools that account for the most dropouts at SDUSD.  The 
                                                                                                                                                             
models, evidence from Bhattacharya et al. (2006) indicates that linear-based models will produce substantially 
biased estimates of treatment effects under conditions similar to those found here.     
13 There are also some atypical schools at SDUSD that focus on helping at-risk students.  I do not include these 
schools in the analysis. 
14 There is also reason to expect teacher quality to play a differential role in affecting dropout outcomes across 
schools on the student side.  Specifically, students dropping out from low-dropout-rate schools are more likely to be 
extreme outliers whereas students dropping out from high-dropout-rate schools may be closer to the margin such 
that teacher quality may be more likely to make a difference.   11 
dropout rate across these four schools ranges from 10 to 20 percent and these schools account for 
almost two-thirds of all dropouts from the 16 standard high schools at SDUSD.
15  I identify a 
student  as  being a part of school  X’s  population  if at  any time in  her schooling career she 
attended school X.  I do not include special-education students in the analysis because these 
students often do not take typical math courses and are not exposed to the typical sets of math 
teachers at their schools. 
 
I was unable to estimate the effects of all of the math teachers in the data because there were 
numerous teachers who taught just a small portion of the student sample.  When these teachers 
were included into the multivariate model the likelihood function did not converge.  Instead, I 
estimate teacher effects for the ten teachers at each school who taught the largest shares of the 
student  population.    These  teachers  taught  between  43  and  59  percent  of  the  math-class 
semesters taken by students at their respective schools over the course of the data panel (these 
shares  are  largely  reflective  of  school  size).
16  Within each school, the  teacher effects are 
estimated relative to the average effect of the omitted teachers.
17   
 
Table 1 summarizes the data from each of the four sc hools.  Note that schools 1, 2 and  3 are 
particularly disadvantaged (for example, see the shares of students participating in free/reduced-
                                                 
15 Although none of the schools at SDUSD qualifies as a “dropout factory” in the sense that less than half of the 
students graduate, the dropout rates at these schools are certainly non-negligible. 
16 There were four teachers who were in the top ten in terms of the number of student semesters taught at their 
respective schools but for whom I was unable to estimate an effect.  For these four teachers, there was insufficient 
variation in their classes taught to identify teacher selection.  In place of these teachers at their respective schools, I 
added the teachers who taught the next most students.    
17 The omitted teachers will bias the coefficients for the remaining teachers to the extent that the variation in classes 
taught between the sets of included and omitted teachers are correlated.  Because of this, some of the individually 
estimated teacher coefficients may not be unbiased estimates for the effects of their respective teachers.  However, 
the primary motivation in this analysis is to determine whether differences in teacher quality influence dropout 
outcomes – that is, to determine whether a distribution of teacher quality exists in terms of dropouts (see Section 
III).  Therefore, teacher effects that are biased only though the omission of other teacher effects will still provide 
valuable insight as long as they are not systematically biased towards zero.   12 
price lunch programs and test-score performance).  School 4 is not nearly as disadvantaged as the 
other three schools based on conventional measures.  Nonetheless, the dropout rate at school 4 is 
non-negligible and because of its size, it still accounts for a large fraction of the total number of 
dropouts at SDUSD.   
 
III.  Results 
 
The idea of an absolute “teacher effect” is inconsequential because every student has a teacher.  
The question of interest is whether differences in teacher quality influence student outcomes.  To 
answer this question in terms of dropouts, I estimate teacher effects from the model in Section I 
for 40 teachers at the four schools described in Table 1.  As indicated above, these teacher effects 
are estimated relative to the average effect of the omitted teachers at each school where the 
omitted-teacher groups are comprised of the teachers who teach the fewest students.  The extent 
to which the 40 estimated teacher effects differ from the within-school, average-omitted-teacher 
effects,  and  each  other,  will  determine  the  extent  to  which  differences  in  teacher  quality 
influence dropout outcomes.  If teacher quality did not influence dropout outcomes, all of the 
teacher effects would be statistically indistinguishable from zero. 
 
I estimate the dropout model separately for each school, which means that the analysis evaluates 
within-school  variation  in  teacher  quality.    The  by-school  approach  is  appealing  given  the 
computational demands of the multivariate probit.  Furthermore, I reject the null hypothesis that 
the coefficients on the non-teacher variables in the models are equal across the four schools.
18  
The primary implication of focusing on within -school variation in teacher quality is that my 
                                                 
18 I test for parameter equality using a multivariate-probit model where I substitute for individual teachers with 
teacher qualifications (see Section VI).  Estimating the four-school model with the 40 individual teacher effects 
using the multivariate-probit approach, which requires the simultaneous estimation of 41 equations, was not feasible.   13 
results will understate the potential effects of changes in teacher quality on dropout outcomes to 
the extent that quality varies across schools.   
 
Teacher effects are estimated from two different specifications at each school.  First, I use a basic 
probit that ignores any endogeneity between teacher selection and dropout outcomes.   Next, I 
run  the  multivariate  probit  described  above  in  which  I  instrument  for  teacher  selection  and 
estimate teacher effects via simulated maximum likelihood.
19,20  In each model at each school, I 
reject  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  included  teacher  effects  are  jointly  insignificant  at  the  5-
percent level of confidence or better.  The null hypothesis that the error terms in the dropout and 
teacher-selection equations are uncorrelated is rejected at the 1-percent level of confidence at all 
four schools. 
 
Table 2 shows the non-teacher results from the models for school 1.
21  The non-teacher results 
for schools 2 through 4 are available in Appendix Tables A.1  –  A.3.    Although  there  is 
heterogeneity across the four schools in the parameter estimates for the non-teacher components 
                                                 
19 I use the mvprobit module in Stata by Cappellari and Jenkins (2003) to estimate the model. This module uses 
estimates from the individual univariate probit specifications as initial parameter values.  
20 The econometrics literature provides limited coverage on the topics of instrument validity and relevance for 
models such as the multivariate probit (nonlinear, with multiple endogenous variables).  With a lack of available 
formal tests for instrument evaluation, I make the following two assertions about the instruments used here: First, 
with regard to instrument relevance, univariate probits suggest that the instruments are strong predictors of teacher 
selection.  In 39 of the 40 univariate-probit teacher-selection equations, Wald tests reject instrument irrelevance at 
the 1-percent level of confidence (the 40
th equation rejects irrelevance at the 10-percent level).  Although these tests 
are informative, note that they are imperfect because the instruments are predicting multiple endogenous variables 
and the univariate probits do not take this into account.  Second, with regard to instrument validity, Hansen-J over-
identification tests performed on the linear analogs to the multivariate probits provide no suggestion that the 
instruments are invalid.  P-values from these tests range from 0.28 to 0.70 across the four schools.  However, these 
tests are again imperfect.  Work by Bhattacharya et al. (2006) shows that the linear-probability-model versions of 
the multivariate probits will perform poorly, particularly in the application here where dropout outcomes are 
relatively low-probability events. 
21 I do not report marginal effects here.  Unlike for the teachers, calculating the marginal effects on dropout 
outcomes for the non-teacher components is cumbersome because each non-teacher component affects dropouts 
directly and through teacher selection.  The results in Table 2 and the corresponding appendix tables are meant only 
to provide a basic overview of the models.   14 
of the models, there are a few general patterns worth mentioning.  First, as expected, the entry-
level math courses are strong predictors of dropout outcomes with higher entry-level courses 
being  associated  with  lower  dropout  rates.    Second,  conditional  on  these  entry-level  math 
courses, typically important demographic characteristics do not significantly predict dropouts.  
For  example,  parental  education,  race  and  gender  indicators  are  generally  not  significant 
predictors of dropout outcomes once students’ entry-level math courses are controlled for in the 
models.  Finally, in addition to entry-level math courses and some teacher effects (as shown in 
Tables 3 – 6), the only other consistently significant predictor of students’ dropout outcomes is 
English-learner status. 
 
Tables 3 through 6 detail the estimated teacher effects at the four schools.  Columns 1 and 2 
report coefficient estimates from the basic models and columns 3 and 4 report estimates from the 
multivariate  probits.
22  Teachers  are  ordered  by  their  estimated  marginal  effects   in  the 
multivariate probits.  At schools 1 through 4 respectively, 20, 14.8, 13.5 and 9.9 percent of the 
student samples ultimately drop out of school.   
 
Across the four schools, 13 out of the 40 estimated math-teacher coefficients (or 33 percent) are 
statistically different from the average effect of the omitted teachers indicating that differences in 
teacher  quality  can  indeed  affect  dropout  outcomes.    Furthermore,  the  magnitudes  of  the 
(marginal) teacher effects imply that they are economically meaningful, ranging from 4.2 to 14.1 
percentage points.  For example, at school 3, where 13.5 percent of the student sample ultimately 
                                                 
22 Teachers’ marginal effects are straightforward to calculate because teachers enter into the model as independent 
variables only in the dropout equation.  Note that the reported marginal effects are calculated as the average of the 
marginal effects across students.  Standard errors are approximated using the delta method where the explanatory 
variables are evaluated at their sample averages within each school.   15 
drops out of school, five teachers have marginal effects that, relative to the average effect of the 
omitted teachers, are of a magnitude greater than 5 percentage points.  These estimates imply a 
significant margin by which teacher quality can affect dropout outcomes.   
 
The point estimates for the teacher effects are predominantly negative.  Of the 13 statistically 
significant  teacher  effects,  12  are  negative.    For  the  remaining  27  teacher  effects  that  are 
statistically insignificant, 21 of 27 have a negative point estimate.  If these insignificant teacher 
effects were all true zeros, the probability of observing 21 of 27 negative point estimates by 
chance is less than one third of one percent.  Overall, the results imply that the teachers who 
teach the most students at these schools are generally more effective at reducing dropout rates 
than those that teach the least (recall that the average-omitted-teacher effects are based on the 
teachers who teach the fewest students).  There are numerous potential explanations for this.  
One possibility is that the results reflect selection.  On the one hand, teachers who teach the 
fewest students at these low-performing schools may do so because they are not offered more 
classes than absolutely necessary by administrators because administrators knows they are of low 
quality.  It may also be that the teachers who teach the most students select into teaching at these 
schools precisely because they are effective at deterring dropout outcomes.  If this were the case, 
some of these teachers might actually choose to work with the most disadvantaged students at 
their schools.  The empirical results are consistent with this hypothesis.  The changes in the 
teacher-effect  estimates  when moving  from  the  endogenous  specification to  the instrumental 
variables specification (columns 2 and 4 in the tables above) suggest that some of the teachers 
who are best at deterring dropout outcomes may be matched with students who are more likely to 
drop out (for example, see teachers 1 and 2 at school 2, teachers 1, 2, 3 and 4 at school 3, etc.).    16 
Because the multivariate-probit estimates are much noisier than the basic-probit estimates, these 
changes in the point estimates are merely suggestive.  Nonetheless, they could reflect a concerted 
effort by these teachers (and administrators) to deter dropouts.   
 
A  second  possibility  is  that  the  results  reflect  the  fact  that  the  included  teachers  are  more 
qualified, and more experienced, than the omitted teachers.  I investigate this explanation in 
detail in Section VI. 
 
IV.  Potential Sources of Estimation Bias  
Here I consider two potential sources of bias in the teacher-effect estimates from the dropout 
models.  First, my empirical approach necessitates a focus on math teachers because variation in 
the classes taught by teachers over time, which is used to identify the teacher effects, is largest 
among math teachers.  School administrators and popular media have argued that math is a 
decisive  subject  for  students’  graduation  outcomes  (Helfand,  2006).    For  example,  speaking 
about algebra in 2006, Los Angeles Unified School District Superintendent Roy Romer was 
quoted as saying “It triggers dropouts more than any single subject.”  However, one concern with 
my approach is that exposure to an above-average math teacher may also imply exposure to an 
above-average  English  teacher,  an  above-average  history  teacher,  and  so  on,  which  will 
influence dropout outcomes.  On the one hand, even if the estimated math-teacher effects are 
biased by other teacher effects, the primary question of whether differences in teacher quality 
affect dropout outcomes can still be answered.  Nonetheless, clearer inference can be made if 
bias from non-math teachers is minimized.  There are three factors limiting, if not removing, this 
bias in  my estimates.   First,  I include controls for students’ entry-level math courses in the   17 
dropout equation (1), which will capture any across-subject tracking effects at the group level 
(note that teacher effects are identified from group-level student exposure).  Second, because the 
teacher effects are identified from group-level student exposure, they should not be confounded 
by the potentially high correlation of teacher quality across subjects within students.  Third, there 
is only very weak student tracking across subjects in San Diego secondary schools (Koedel, 
2007).    Given  my  identification  strategy,  if  teacher  quality  in  non-math  subjects  were  to 
influence my results it would have to be the case that staffing changes in non-math subjects 
happened to occur as staffing changes occurred in math and students’ group-level class-taking 
behaviors were  highly  correlated across subjects.  For example,  even  with contemporaneous 
staffing  changes  across  subjects,  pre-algebra  students  would  have  to  predominantly  take  the 
same English class(es) for the pre-algebra instrument to predict English-teacher selection with 
any  relevance.    This  does  not  appear  to  be  the  case  at  SDUSD.    Koedel  (2007)  provides 
empirical evidence indicating that math students are highly dispersed into the classrooms  of 
other teachers in different subjects.  One explanation for the wide dispersion is structural: math 
in secondary school is not a grade-level specific subject whereas most other subjects are. 
 
A second concern with my empirical approach is that some teachers might only teach students at 
certain grade levels, which could create a mechanical relationship between teacher selection and 
dropouts.  This concern is somewhat alleviated because math is not a grade-level-specific subject 
in secondary school, meaning that math teachers teach students in multiple grades, and because 
students drop out in all grades in high school.
23  More importantly, the exposure from which the 
teacher effects are identified is not grade-level specific.  To see this, consider a teacher, teacher 
                                                 
23 In fact, 95 percent of the math teachers evaluated in this study taught students in at least three out of the four 
grade levels in high school and 90 percent taught students in all four grade levels.     18 
A, who taught algebra at school X in year Y.  Even if all of the students taught by teacher A 
happened to be in the ninth grade, the instruments will identify teacher A’s effect based on all 
students who took algebra in year Y, regardless of grade-level.  That is, the instruments do not 
distinguish students’ grade levels so teacher A’s effect is identified based on all students whose 
cohort-specific math-course paths include some positive probability of taking algebra in year Y.  
Empirically, I can verify that teachers’ grade-level shares do not predict their estimated dropout 
effects.  After estimating the teacher effects from the multivariate probits above, I run a second-
stage  weighted  regression  where  I  regress  the  estimated  teacher  effects  on  school  indicator 
variables and the shares of each teacher’s students who are taught in each subject and at each 
grade level.  For example, the grade-level share for the 11
th grade for teacher X is calculated as 
the total  number of  11
th-grade  students  taught  by  teacher X divided by the total  number of 
students taught by teacher X.  The grade-level shares are all insignificant in this regression with 
t-statistics ranging from 0.5 to 0.7 in absolute value. 
 
The result that the teacher-effect estimates are not influenced by students’ grade levels is partly 
attributable to my focus on math teachers at disadvantaged schools.  All of the math teachers at 
these schools teach some low-level classes (i.e., geometry and below) because there are not 
enough students taking high-level classes to allow teachers to specialize in these classes.  Also, 
the low-level classes contain more students in higher grade levels because many students never 
take  high-level  math.    Therefore,  students  at  these  disadvantaged  schools  are  not  heavily 
stratified across math teachers by grade level.  If an analysis were based on more advantaged 
schools, where there were large populations of students taking advanced math classes, some 
teachers might only teach advanced classes with older students.  Furthermore, low-level math   19 
classes at advantaged schools will likely contain fewer older students, implying that students will 
be more stratified by grade level across teachers.  In this case, students’ grade levels might be 
expected to have more influence on the estimated teacher effects and on the estimated variance 
of teacher quality (for example, differences in teacher quality among 12
th-grade calculus teachers 
would be unlikely to affect dropout outcomes).   
 
V.  Mechanisms 
Here I consider how variation in teacher quality might affect dropout outcomes.  Specifically, I 
look to see if the dropout effects estimated in Section III can be linked to teachers’ effects on 
student performance measured by grade reports or standardized test scores.   
 
I  estimate  teacher  effects  on  students’  grade  reports  using  the  same  instrumental-variables 
approach  as  the  dropout  models  where  I  instrument  for  teacher  selection  using  students’ 
projected math-course paths.   To maintain consistency  with  the dropout  analysis,  I  evaluate 
teachers based on students’ grade point averages (GPAs) for their entire high-school careers.  
Because GPAs are not binary outcomes, I revert to a linear specification and estimate teacher 
effects via GMM.  I consider three models at each school where the dependent variables for each 
student are overall GPA in high school, overall math GPA in high school and overall non-math 
GPA in high school.  This latter model is of particular interest because it excludes math teachers’ 
direct effects on GPAs by excluding math grades. GPA data were not available for all students – 
I use just the fraction of the student sample for which I have grade-report data at each school.
24   
 
                                                 
24 The grade-report data are imperfect.  In addition to some students not having grades, others only have grades for 
some classes.  I aggregate students GPAs for their entire high-school careers at SDUSD which may somewhat offset 
the missing-data problems.    20 
Figure 2 documents the teacher-effect results from the grade-report models for the four schools 
based  on  students’  overall  GPAs.    Teachers  are  ordered  as  in  Tables  3  through  6  above.  
Appendix  B  provides  data  tables  corresponding  to  Figure  2.    These  tables  also  show  each 
teacher’s separate effects on math and non-math GPA outcomes. 
 
Because I non-randomly chose the teachers for whom I estimate dropout effects, these teachers 
are likely to differ more from the group of omitted teachers than from each other.  However, 
even among the group of 40 teachers that I evaluate here there is a clear negative relationship 
between teachers’ dropout effects and GPA effects, implying a positive quality correlation.  To 
evaluate this relationship, I divide each teacher effect in each model by its own standard error 
and estimate the correlations between the vectors of weighted GPA effects and weighted dropout 
effects.  These correlations between the total-GPA/math-GPA/non-math-GPA effects and the 
dropout  effects  are  -0.24/-0.08/-0.26.    Furthermore,  note  that  for  the  13  teachers  who  have 
statistically significant dropout effects across the four schools, none have statistically significant 
GPA effects that would imply a negative quality correlation (i.e., same-signed dropout and GPA 
effects).  In fact, 9 of the 13 have opposite-signed total-GPA effects and 11 of 13 have opposite-
signed non-math-GPA effects (just 4 of which are statistically significant in each case).  The 
finding that effective math teachers, measured by dropout rates, improve students’ grades in non-
math subjects suggests that these teachers are either improving students’ cognitive skills in these 
subjects  or  generating  an  effort  response  that  is  reflected  in  the  grade  reports.    The  latter 
explanation is consistent with evidence from the education literature, which suggests that grade 
reports for disadvantaged students are strongly affected by student effort (more so than for their   21 
advantaged peers whose grade reports depend more on academic performance - see, for example, 
Howley et al., 2000, or Stiggins et al., 1989). 
 
The GPA results also alleviate one possible concern with this analysis: that the teachers who are 
the most “effective” at reducing dropout rates are simply easy teachers who allow students to 
pass classes that they should perhaps not pass.  Given that the correlation between teachers’ 
dropout  effects  and  non-math  GPA  effects  is  larger  than  the  correlation  between  teachers’ 
dropout effects and math-GPA effects, this explanation for the dropout effect seems unlikely.  
Furthermore,  the  difference  between  these  correlations  is  even  more  pronounced  among  the 
subset of teachers who have statistically significant dropout effects.   The correlation between 
these teachers’ non-math-GPA effects and their dropout effects is -0.47.  For their math-GPA 
effects, it is just -0.04.  In conjunction with the non-math-GPA effects, the negligible math-GPA 
effects support work by Figlio and Lucas (2004), who show that teachers with higher grading 
standards  produce  better  results  for  students.    That  is,  if  the  non-math-GPA  effects  reflect 
increased student effort, the fact that this increased effort has no effect on students’ math GPAs 
suggests that the most effective math teachers are not easy graders. 
 
I also consider the extent to which teachers’ dropout effects can be linked to their effects on 
standardized test scores.  I use results from Koedel (2007) for comparison, who evaluates teacher 
value-added to test scores for secondary-school teachers at SDUSD.  I compare the effects of the 
math teachers evaluated here, measured by dropout outcomes, to the effects of these same math 
teachers measured by students’ test scores.  The estimates from Koedel (2007) are based on math 
test scores from the ninth through eleventh grades on the Stanford 9 exam (students are not tested   22 
in the twelfth grade at SDUSD), which is not a high stakes test.  The value-added comparison 
does not indicate any link between teacher effectiveness measured by test scores and teacher 
effectiveness measured by dropout outcomes.  This might be expected if dropout effects reflect 
teachers’ abilities to improve student effort but not cognitive performance, or if standardized 
tests are inflexible enough that they cannot detect improvements in schooling performance that 
might accompany a student’s decision to complete high school.   
 
Finally, note that in analyzing students’ GPAs and test scores, teacher effects may be driven by 
the performance of a different population of students than in the case of dropouts.  For example, 
if a given teacher is particularly effective with disadvantaged students but particularly ineffective 
with advantaged students, GPA and test-score analyses might indicate that this teacher, overall, 
is essentially average.  However, in the case of dropouts, the advantaged students are not on the 
dropout margin to begin with so this teacher’s dropout effect will be predominantly driven by her 
effect  on  disadvantaged  students.  Put  differently,  this  teacher’s  advantaged  students  may 
underperform on standardized tests but are unlikely to drop out. 
 
VI.  Teacher Effectiveness and Resume Characteristics 
The analysis thus far shows that individual teachers can have large effects on dropout outcomes.   
On the one hand, this information will be useful to policymakers in itself because it presents 
evidence  of  an  additional  dimension  along  which  teacher  quality  affects  student  outcomes.  
However, it provides little direct guidance to policymakers hoping to identify effective teachers.  
In this section, I attempt to link teachers’ dropout effects to their observable qualifications, which   23 
would allow administrators to more easily identify the teachers who will be effective in deterring 
dropouts.   
 
Table 7 details the differences between the samples of included and omitted teachers in terms of 
observable qualifications.  Given that the included teachers were chosen because they taught the 
most students, it is not surprising that they are more experienced.  Also, a much larger share of 
the included teachers have the basic qualifications that are commonly associated with effective 
teaching in math.   
 
To  estimate  the  causal  effects  of  teacher  qualifications  on  dropout  outcomes,  I  again  use 
students’ class schedules as in the dropout and grade-report analyses.  However, here I predict 
student  exposure  to  teacher  qualifications  rather  than  to  specific  teachers.    I  consider  four 
teacher  qualifications  that  are  commonly  associated  with  teacher  quality.    First,  I  look  at 
exposure to math teachers who are inexperienced, where I define inexperienced teachers as those 
with  three  years  of  teaching  experience  or  less.    Second,  I  evaluate  the  effect  of  teachers’ 
education levels as measured by whether teachers have master’s degrees.  Third, I consider two 
measures that might be associated with math-teacher quality specifically: whether teachers have 
bachelors’ degrees in math and whether teachers are fully authorized to teach math.  The latter 
qualification, the math authorization, requires that teachers complete a set of university courses 
prescribed by the California Commission on Teacher Credentialing.  I do not look at the effect of 
exposure  to  fully  credentialed  teachers  because  over  94%  of  teachers  at  SDUSD  are  fully 
credentialed, leaving little variation to identify the effect of exposure to this qualification. 
   24 
Unlike the teacher-specific analysis, it is unintuitive to model the exposure of students to teacher 
qualifications as binary.  For example, more than half of the teachers across the four schools 
have math authorizations and almost half have master’s degrees.  Instead, I consider the effects 
of the total numbers of “qualified” teachers who teach each student as measured by the four 
criteria described above (or, in the case of teacher experience, the total number of “unqualified” 
teachers).  The outcome of interest is still the binary dropout outcome; however, the teacher-
qualification  measures  are  not  binary.    Although  a  simple  solution  would  be  to  specify  the 
teacher-qualification  and  dropout  equations  as  linear  and  run  models  that  are  otherwise 
analogous to the multivariate probit, Bhattacharya et al. (2006) indicates that such an approach 
will produce substantially biased estimates of treatment effects.  As an alternative, I preserve the 
probit-based  approach  developed  in  Section  I  by  re-classifying  the  teacher-qualification 
measures as binary.  Specifically, at each school, I define the number of qualified teachers that 
teach each student as either “above-average” or “below-average” within that school.
25  I then use 
students’ class schedules to instrument for exposure to an above-average number of qualified 
teachers in a 5-equation multivariate probit.
26  The equation of interest is again the dropout 
equation and there are four teacher -qualification equations.  Table 8 details the estimated 
marginal effects of having been taught by an above -average number of qualified teachers as 
measured by each of the observable qualifications described above. 
                                                 
25 I also consider fractional-response models where each teacher-qualification measure is coded as the share of the 
semesters of high-school in which a student is taught by a teacher with that qualification.  These models produce 
results that are qualitatively similar to those presented below. 
26 Unlike in the teacher-specific multivariate probits, there is no obvious and consistent way to pare down the 
instrument sets for the teacher-qualification equations.  Therefore, in the models for each school, I select four 
different but potentially overlapping subsets of the class-schedule instruments and run each qualifications model 
four times.  The results from the four models within each school are virtually identical regardless of which subset of 
the instruments I use to identify the qualifications effects.  This should be expected if the instruments are truly valid 
given that they are identifying teacher effects from the same underlying source of variation.  Because the results are 
so similar across the four models at each school, there is no clear justification for presenting the results based on one 
subset of instruments over another so I simply chose one set of results to show for each school in Table 8.   25 
 
Table 8 suggests that students who are exposed to sets of more-educated teachers are more likely 
to  graduate.    The  teacher-education  effect  is  particularly  pronounced  at  schools  3  and  4.  
However, with regard to the other teacher qualifications, no clear patterns emerge.  Note that 
exposure  to  more  inexperienced  teachers  seems  to  reduce  dropout  rates  at  school  3,  which 
contradicts  both  intuition  and  a  substantial  body  of  empirical  evidence  showing  that 
inexperienced teachers are generally less effective (for example, see Rivkin, Hanushek and Kain, 
2005).  One explanation for this finding is that the results in Table 8 are biased by negative 
selection.  Recall that the four schools evaluated here are four of the most disadvantaged schools 
in  the  district.    Like  most  school  districts,  teachers  with  better  qualifications  are  generally 
favored in the hiring process at SDUSD.  If teaching positions at these disadvantaged schools are 
generally undesirable, highly-qualified teachers who teach at these schools may be the least able 
as evidenced by their inability to obtain employment at better schools.
27  Given the possibility of 
negative-selection  bias,  it  is  impossible  to  rule  ou t  causal  teacher -qualification  effects.  
Furthermore, to the extent such bias does exist, it strengthens the evidence that teacher education 
may be a particularly effective tool in reducing dropouts. 
 
VII.  Concluding Remarks 
This paper uses a unique instrumental-variables approach to identify teacher effects on students’ 
dropout  outcomes.    Differences  in  teacher  quality  are  shown  to  play  an  important  role  in 
determining these outcomes, implying that improvements in teacher quality can help mitigate the 
graduation-rate crisis faced by many urban school districts across the country (as dubbed by 
Orfield et al., 2004).  However, the current structure of teacher recruitment and compensation in 
                                                 
27 As discussed in Section III, it is also possible that some teachers prefer teaching at these schools.    26 
most  school  districts,  which  generally  provides  little  incentive  for  teachers  to  teach  at 
disadvantaged schools, has resulted in the consistent failure of urban schools to attract and retain 
high-quality teachers (Lankford et al., 2002).  This will limit the extent to which teacher-quality 
improvements can be used to combat high dropout rates.  Ultimately, the evidence here suggests 
that increasing the ability of urban schools to recruit and retain high-quality teachers has the 
potential to reduce student dropout rates significantly.      27 
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     Figure 2.  Teacher Effects on Students’ Cumulative Grade Point Averages in High School for all Schools 
       
 
       
Note:  Figure shows point estimates and corresponding 95-percent confidence intervals.   29 
Table 1.  Basic Data Summary 









Initial Year of Data Panel 
 
1997-1998  1997-1998  1997-1998  1997-1998 
Final Year of Data Panel 
 
2003-2004  2003-2004  2003-2004  2003-2004 
Total Number of Students in Data 
Panel 
 
3072  2518  2217  3779 
% Female 
 
48  51  48  49 
% English Learner 
 
49  42  49  15 
% Black 
 
22  13  29  21 
% Hispanic 
 
57  68  36  22 
% Asian 
 
15  3  27  50 
% White 
 
6  15  8  7 
% Parental Ed = College or more 
 
7  9  7  26 
% Free/Reduced-Price Lunch* 
 
100  63  83  44 
Average Test-Scores (Math)** 
 
-0.46  -0.14  -0.46  0.04 
% of Students Who Ultimately 
Drop Out  
 
0.200  0.148  0.135  0.099 
Share of Student Semesters Taught 
by the Top 10 Teachers 
0.514  0.547  0.586  0.428 
*Total share of students on free or reduced-price lunch at school level in the 1999-2000 school year 
** Average score for 9
th-grade test takers at each school over the course of data panel relative to the 9
th-
grade district-wide average, reported in standard deviations of the test.  Based on all students who took the 
test at the relevant school in the 9
th grade.  30 
 
Table 2.  Non-Teacher Results from School 1 - Dependent Variable:  Indicator for 







Multivariate IV Probit 




Re-designated from EL to non-EL 









































Student changed schools mid-year at 











































Number of student observations  3072  3072 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  All students who took intermediate algebra (  > advanced geometry) in 9
th 
grade graduated high school.  Omitted variables are:  Indicator variables for non -EL, non re-designated non-EL, 
white, male, parental education is high school dropout, 9
th grade math class is pre-algebra and all teachers other 
than those listed in Table 2. 
***Significant at 1% level of confidence. 
**Significant at 5% level of confidence. 
*Significant at 10% level of confidence. 
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Multivariate IV Probit 
(Marginal Effects) 
















































































Number of student 
observations 
3072  3072  3072  3072 
Notes: Estimates are relative to the omitted group of teachers as described in the text.   Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
  ***Significant at 1% level of confidence 
**Significant at 5% level of confidence 
*Significant at 10% level of confidence 
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Multivariate IV Probit 
(Marginal Effects) 


















































































Number of student 
observations 
2518  2518  2518  2518 
Notes: Estimates are relative to the omitted group of teachers as described in the text.   Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
  ***Significant at 1% level of confidence 
**Significant at 5% level of confidence 
*Significant at 10% level of confidence 
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Multivariate IV Probit 
(Marginal Effects) 
















































































Number of student 
observations 
2217  2217  2217  2217 
Notes: Estimates are relative to the omitted group of teachers as described in the text.   Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
  ***Significant at 1% level of confidence 
**Significant at 5% level of confidence 
*Significant at 10% level of confidence 
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Multivariate IV Probit 
(Marginal Effects) 
















































































Number of student 
observations 
3779  3779  3779  3779 
Notes: Estimates are relative to the omitted group of teachers as described in the text.   Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
  ***Significant at 1% level of confidence 
**Significant at 5% level of confidence 
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Table 7.  Differences in Observable Qualifications Between the Included and Omitted 
Teachers – All Schools 




     
Average Experience  13.30  10.90 
Share With > 3 Years Average Experience  0.87  0.68 
Share with Math Authorization  0.84  0.56 
Share with BA in Math  0.69  0.38 
Share with Master’s Degree  0.48  0.43 
N  40  115 
Notes:  Qualifications are averaged within teachers where relevant.  For example, if a teacher taught for two years in 
the panel then that teacher’s experience level would be averaged across the two years.  To be included in the 
“omitted teachers” group in the table, teachers had to teach at least 50 student semesters in math over the course of 
the data panel.  The “math authorization” requires that teachers complete a set of university course requirements as 





Table 8.  The Effects of Exposure to an Above-Average Number of Qualified Teachers on 
Students’ Dropout Outcomes 








Qualifications         


































N  3072  2518  2217  3779 
Notes:  Marginal effects are reported and estimated as the average of the marginal effects across the student sample.
  Standard errors in parenthesis.  
***Significant at 1% level of confidence 
**Significant at 5% level of confidence 
*Significant at 10% level of confidence 
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Appendix A 
Non-Teacher Coefficient Estimates from  
Models for Schools 2, 3 and 4 
 
Table A.1.  Non-Teacher Results from School 2 - Dependent Variable:  Indicator for 







Multivariate IV Probit 




Re-designated from EL to non-EL 









































Student changed schools mid-year at 




































Number of student observations  2518  2518 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  All students who took intermediate algebra ( > advanced geometry) in 9
th 
grade graduated high school.  In addition, only six students took the algebra-geometry split at school 2 so that 
control is omitted from the model.  Other omitted variables are:  Indicator variables for non-EL, non re-designated 
non-EL, white, male, parental education is high school dropout, 9
th grade math class is pre-algebra and all teachers 
other than those listed in Table 3. 
***Significant at 1% level of confidence. 
**Significant at 5% level of confidence. 
*Significant at 10% level of confidence.   41 
 
Table A.2.  Non-Teacher Results from School 3 - Dependent Variable:  Indicator for 







Multivariate IV Probit 




Re-designated from EL to non-EL 









































Student changed schools mid-year at 











































Number of student observations  2217  2217 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  All students who took intermediate algebra ( > advanced geometry) in 9
th 
grade graduated high school.  Omitted variables are:  Indicator variables for non-EL, non re-designated non-EL, 
white, male, parental education is high school dropout, 9
th grade math class is pre-algebra and all teachers other 
than those listed in Table 4. 
***Significant at 1% level of confidence. 
**Significant at 5% level of confidence. 
*Significant at 10% level of confidence. 
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Table A.3.  Non-Teacher Results from School 4 - Dependent Variable:  Indicator for 







Multivariate IV Probit 




Re-designated from EL to non-EL 









































Student changed schools mid-year at 











































Number of student observations  3779  3779 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  All students who took intermediate algebra ( > advanced geometry) in 9
th 
grade graduated high school.  Omitted variables are:  Indicator variables for non-EL, non re-designated non-EL, 
white, male, parental education is high school dropout, 9
th grade math class is pre-algebra and all teachers other 
than those listed in Table 5. 
***Significant at 1% level of confidence. 
**Significant at 5% level of confidence. 
*Significant at 10% level of confidence. 
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Appendix B 
Teacher-Effect Estimates from the GPA Analysis 
 







































































































Number of student 
observations 
3072  2938  2938  2938 
Notes: Estimates are relative to the omitted group of teachers as described in the text.   Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
  ***Significant at 1% level of confidence 
**Significant at 5% level of confidence 
*Significant at 10% level of confidence 
   44 







































































































Number of student 
observations 
2518  2513  2513  2513 
Notes: Estimates are relative to the omitted group of teachers as described in the text.   Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
  ***Significant at 1% level of confidence 
**Significant at 5% level of confidence 
*Significant at 10% level of confidence   45 






































































































Number of student 
observations 
2217  2156  2132  2156 
Notes: Estimates are relative to the omitted group of teachers as described in the text.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
  ***Significant at 1% level of confidence 
**Significant at 5% level of confidence 
*Significant at 10% level of confidence 
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Number of student 
observations 
3779  3772  3770  3772 
Notes: Estimates are relative to the omitted group of teachers as described in the text.   Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
  ***Significant at 1% level of confidence 
**Significant at 5% level of confidence 
*Significant at 10% level of confidence 
 
 